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REMARKS OF SETH P. WAXMAN AT THE 
MEMORIAL OBSERVANCE FOR mSTICE BYRON R. 
WHITE, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 
WASHINGTON, D.C., NOVEMBER 18,2002 
Seth P; Waxmad 
Members of the Court, members of the family, and friends of Justice 
White-
Alone among today's speakers, I met Justice White only late in his life. 
Growing up in the law, my relationship with him was the one many kids 
today have with Michael Jordan- I wanted to be "like White" -like the 
kind of man he was. I still have that aspiration. 
Like Byron White, I served in the Department of Justice and was 
altered forever by that honorable institution. l And -like Justice White, 
in my own lesser way, I strove within the walls of this institution to 
protect the authority of the national government. Those themes of 
Justice White's remarkable career-his tenure in the national Executive2 
and his championing of the national Legislature3 - have been 
marvelously captured in the remarks of my colleagues. It is perhaps 
fitting then, in this of all places, to conclude by reflecting on Justice 
White's perspective on the national judicial power-on the role of the 
federal courts. 
+ Mr. Waxman, a partner of the law firm Wilmer,. Cutler & Pickering, and Distinguished 
Visitor from Practice at Georgetown University Law Center, served as Solicitor General 
during the years 1997 through 2001. Mr. Waxman gratefully acknowledges the assistance 
of Paul R.Q. Wolfson. 
1. From 1961 to 1962, Byron White served as· deputy attorney general in the 
Department of Justice under the Kennedy administration. William E. Nelson, Justice 
Byron R. White: A Liberal of 1960, in THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND 
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 139, 140-41 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993) (detailing White's 
position on the Kennedy team and his influence on the Department's role in civil rights); 
see also Kenneth Jost, The Legacy of Justice Byron' White;. in AM. BAR ASS'N, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND ITS JUSTICES 209, 213 (Jesse H .. Choper ed., 2001) (discussing 
White's role and duties as deputy to Attorney General'Robert Kennedy). 
2. Jost, supra note 1, at 213; Nelson, supra note' 1, at 140-4'1. 
3. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF DEM(i)CRACY: LAW AS A PUBLIC 
PROFESSION 202 (1999) (articulating White's acknowledgment that Congress should have 
complete responsibility in responding to public administJlation problems); Jost, supra note 
1, at 217-18 (noting White's career theme cif deference to Congress); Nelson, supra note 1, 
at 154 (describing White's consistent efforts to uphold Congressional remedies for 
inequality and injustice in society). 
973 
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Justice White is often spoken of as an apostle of judicial restraint.4 
That label is true, but incomplete. Justice White was certainly averse to 
the courts engaging in what he thought of as second-guessing legislative 
policy concerns.5 That aversion was at its apex when the claim was 
grounded in substantive due process,6 the First Amendment,7 or the 
separation of powers.s 
4. Jost, supra note], at 211 ("He believed in judicial restraint .... "); see also Jack 
Wade Nowlin, The Constitution,11 Illegitimacy of Expansive Judicial Power: A Populist 
Structur,11 Interpretive Analysis, 89 Ky. L.J. 387,462-63 (2000-2001) (listing Justice White 
among the Justices of the 20th Century who advocated judicial minimalism). 
5. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., 
dissenting) (stating that "the Court has no license to invalidate legislation which it thinks 
merely arbitrary or unreasonable"). See also DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO 
ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON F. WHITE 397 (1998) 
(listing cases in which White advocated deferring to Congress' legislative judgment). 
6. Justice White cautioned in his dissent in Moore v. City of East Clevelandthat: 
Although the Court regularly proceeds on the assumption that the Due Process 
Clause has more than a procedural dimension, we must always bear in mind that 
the substantive content of the Clause is suggested neither by its language nor by 
preconstitutional history; that content is nothing more than the accumulated 
product of judicial interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments .... 
. . . That the Court has ample precedent for the creation of new constitutional 
rights should not lead it to repeat the process at will. The Judiciary, including 
this Court, is the most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals 
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the 
language or even the design of the Constitution. Realizing that the present 
construction of the Due Process Clause represents a major judicial gloss on its 
terms, as well as on the anticipation of the Framers, and that much of the 
underpinning for the broad, substantive application of the Clause disappeared in 
the conflict between the Executive and the Judiciary in the] 930's and 1940's, the 
Court should be extremely reluctant to breathe still further substantive content 
into the Due Process Clause so as to strike down legislation .... 
Moore, 431 U.S. at 543-44 (White, J., dissenting). 
7. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689-90 (1972) (denying journalists a 
testimonial privilege to withhold the identity of their sources); see also HENRY J. 
ABRAHAM, "JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS": A POLITICAL HISTORY OF ApPOINTMENTS 
TO THE SUPREME COURT 280 (3d ed. 1992) (contrasting White's First Amendment 
jurisprudence with that of Justice Stewart); CARRINGTON, supra note 3, at 198-99 
(summarizing some of Justice White's First Amendment decisions); Nelson, supra note 1, 
at 151-52 (analyzing a distinction between Justice White's votes and opinions in freedom-
of-expression cases reSUlting from protests against racial discrimination and the Vietnam 
War, based primarily on whether political authority structures were threatened by the 
protests). 
8. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 759-76 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the Court's interpretation of separation of powers in striking down the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967-1003 (1983) (White, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the Court should not have used Article I requirements to 
invalidate all legislative vetoes; rather, the Court should use the more narrow separation-
of-powers doctrine as a ground for invalidating, if necessary, the veto on a case-by-case 
basis). 
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But Justice White did not shrink from extending constitutional 
guarantees to new areas. He embraced the effort to give women real 
Equal Protection;9 he fashioned a vigorous standard of rational-basis 
review in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cente~ Inc.;IO he authored 
Edwards v. Arizona,11 extending Miranda v. Arizona,12 from which he 
had dissented;13 and he wrote the Court's opinion in Coker v. Georgia,14 
striking down capital punishment for rape. IS 
The pattern, then, is a nuanced one: judicial restraint, but only from 
going "too far." Where Justice White thought federal guarantees were at 
stake, he did not hesitate to act. 16 In his view, the courts were fully 
empowered to remedy an injury to a federal right. 17 
Consider one of his most remarkable decisions, Missouri v. Jenkins,ls 
which held that a federal court had the authority to disregard a state-
9. See genemlly N.Y. State Club Ass'n Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) 
(upholding an amendment to New York City's Human Rights Law, which prohibited 
discrimination against women and minorities in private clubs found to be public in 
nature); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (finding that Missouri's 
workers' compensation laws, denying a widower benefits on his wife's work-related death, 
violated the woman's Equal Protection rights because the amount her spouse would 
receive from her work-related death would be less than the benefits payable to the spouse 
of a deceased male worker). 
10. 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (refusing to recognize the mentally retarded as a quasi-
suspect class, Justice White maintained that they should nonetheless be protected from 
invidious discrimination by requiring the State to demonstrate that the legislation 
distinguishing between the mentally retarded and others is "rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental purpose"). 
11. 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (prohibiting the use of the suspect's confession at trial 
because it was obtained when police re-initiated contact with the suspect after he had 
invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, but before counsel was provided). 
12. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring that suspects be informed of their rights before 
police initiate custodial interrogation). 
13. Id at 526 (White, J., dissenting). 
14. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that a sentence of death for the crime of rape 
violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 
because it constituted grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment). 
15. Id at 592. 
16. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). In Duncan, Justice White 
authored the Court's opinion holding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial 
in a criminal case extended to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 149. The 
Court recognized that trial by jury was a fundamental right in the American system of 
criminal justice, and therefore the states were required to provide a jury trial to criminal 
defendants. See id at 148-49. 
17. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 240-71 (1971) (White, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the closure of public pools in the city of Jackson, Mississippi, in response to a 
court desegregation ruling, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and that the judicial system should provide remedial action). 
18. 495 U.S. 33 (1990). 
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imposed ceiling on property taxes in order to fully fund a desegregation 
decree. 19 The lower court's order was assailed on the ground that federal 
courts have no power to raise taxes.20 But Justice White saw the issue 
differently. The only question, in his view, was whether a State could 
disable itself from complying with the federal constitution by enacting a 
budget cap and then pleading poverty.21 To Justice White, the answer 
under the Supremacy Clause was clearly no, and a federal court was fully 
empowered to provide that answer, and to order the State to comply.22 
The sources on which Justice White relied in Jenkins are revealing. 
First, he looked to the one-person, one-vote cases, which had invalidated 
several state constitutional provisions providing for the apportionment of 
state legislative bodies.23 Second, he relied on the old "coupon cases" of 
the 1880s, in which the federal courts had invalidated the States' efforts 
to evade payment on their bonds.24 To Justice White, the principles were 
exactly the same: no matter how enshrined a rule was in state law, if the 
19. Id. at 57. The Court found that the district court's action of directly imposing a 
tax increase was an abuse of its equitable discretion. [d. at 37, 50. Nevertheless, the Court 
reasoned that the district court could have required the Kansas City, Missouri School 
District (KCMSD) to levy property taxes at the rate necessary to fund the desegregation 
remedy and concurrently enjoin the operation of any state law that would have prevented 
the district from taking such action. Id. at 51. The Court found that a local government, 
which possesses taxing authority, may be ordered by a court to levy taxes in excess of any 
limit established by state statute where there is reason stemming from the Constitution for 
ignoring the statutory limitation. Id. at 57. See also Christopher W. Nelson, Comment, 
Missouri v. Jenkins: Judicial Taxation and the Funding of School Desegregation, 26 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 529, 529-30 (1991) (discussing the significance of the Court's holding and its 
implications on the equitable powers of the federal courts). 
20. Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 37. 
21. See id. at 53-54 (noting the procedural history of the case and the inconsistent 
positions taken by the State: first, attempting to avoid any allocation of the costs imposed 
by the court, and second, arguing that the court should assign the costs to the State rather 
than interfere with state law by allowing KCMSD to collect the money via increased 
taxes). 
Id. 
22. Id. at 57. Justice White wrote: 
Here, the KCMSD may be ordered to levy taxes despite the statutory limitations 
on its authority in order to compel the discharge of an obligation imposed on 
KCMSD by the Fourteenth Amendment. To hold otherwise would fail to take 
account of the obligations of local governments, under the Supremacy Clause, to 
fulfill the requirements that the Constitution imposes on them. 
23. Id. at 55 (citing N.Y. City Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989); 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964)). 
24. Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 55-57, 56 n.20; see also Nelson, supra note 19, at 557-58 
(detailing the Court's reliance on the "bond obligation" decisions). 
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rule violated a federal guarantee, it had to be "disestablished" by the 
federal courts.25 
Missouri v. Jenkins illustrates Justice White's belief that all three 
branches of the national government should possess fully adequate 
powers with which to accomplish their constitutionally delegated tasks.26 
For Justice White, as for earlier nationalists like Chief Justice Marsha1l27 
and Justice Story,28 the fundamental issue of constitutional law was the 
task of constituting a national government competent to meet the 
challenges of a changing society.29 Included within that governmental 
power is the authority of the federal courts to get the job done. 
Consider Jenkins in connection with three of Justice White's famous 
dissents.3o He is not known as a great dissenter31 -toward the end of his 
career, he probably dissented less frequently than any other Justice.32 
25. See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 55 (rejecting the State's Tenth Amendment argument 
and upholding the power of federal courts to "disestablish" local government laws that are 
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment). 
26. See id. (noting that the federal courts have the equitable power to establish and 
enforce remedies necessary in meeting the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment); 
see also Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 760 (1992) (summarizing the Court's decision in Jenkins as 
allowing federal courts to use remedies that may contravene state laws, if necessary to 
comply with the Constitution). 
27. Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the "Great" Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1111, 1134, 1137, 1172 (2001) (characterizing Chief Justice Marshall and his 
Court's opinions as nationalist); H. Jefferson Powell, Reimaging the Marshall Court, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 1527, 1532 (1989) (analyzing the nature of the Marshall Court's 
nationalism). 
28. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why 
State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 
841 (1998) (describing Justice Joseph Story as "ultranationalist"); Klarman, supra note 27, 
at 1172 (asserting that Justice Story's nationalist philosophy surpassed Chief Justice 
Marshall's in intensity). 
29. See Jost, supra note 1, at 211 (describing White's approach in utilizing the Court's 
authority to support policies adopted by the other branches of the federal government); 
see also Nelson, supra note 1, at 147 (articulating examples of White's nationalist views). 
30. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 764 (1982) (White, J., dissenting); Milliken v. 
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 762 (1974) (White, J., dissenting); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,439 (1964) (White, J., dissenting). 
31. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 311 (5th ed. 2000) (showing a table of the comparison of dissent rates among 
Justices, and listing the "great dissenters," notably omitting Justice White). 
32. HUTCHINSON, supra note 5, at 355 (stating that "[d]uring his tenure on the 
Supreme Court of the United States, White wrote 1,275 opinions-495 opinions of the 
Court, 249 concurring opinions, and 572 dissents (354 from decisions on the merits or as to 
jurisdiction, 218 from denials of certiorari)"). Perhaps in contrast to dissenting opinions 
on the merits, Hutchinson describes Justice White's vigorous writing of dissents from 
denials of certiorari, and points out that publication of such dissents in the U.S. Reports 
dropped off dramatically after White's retirement from the Court in 1993. Id. at 400-01; 
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But when they came, his dissents were powerful, and many of the most 
powerful ones would have vindicated the authority of the federal courtS.33 
His first major dissent was in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.34 
In that case, the Court concluded that federal courts may not adjudicate 
whether a foreign government's "act of state" violates internationallaw.35 
To Justice White, this was an abdication of the authority of the federal 
courts to do what they are supposed to do-determine and announce the 
law.36 He readily acknowledged the President's foreign affairs 
authority;37 indeed, he would have deferred to a formal request by the 
State Department seeking non-adjudication. 3R But his dissent shows that 
he believed that when the issue was declaring and enforcing international 
law, the federal courts are very much the equal of the other branches of 
39 government. 
Consider too Justice White's dissent in Milliken v. Bradley,4o in which 
the Court held that federal courts have no authority to issue a multi-
district order to remedy segregation within a single school district.41 Had 
Milliken gone the other way, the entire recent history of American 
public education might well have been different. 
In Justice White's view, the Court in Milliken "cripple[d] the ability of 
the judiciary,,42 to remedy violations of constitutional rights by means of 
what he saw as an arbitrary rule-a strict dictate that remedies in school 
see also O'BRIEN, supra note 31, at 213-14 (tracking Justice White's publication of 
dissents from denials of certiorari). 
33. See e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377-79 (1978) 
(White, J., dissenting). In Kroger, the Court reversed an Eighth Circuit holding that the 
district court lacked power to hear the plaintiff's lawsuit because true diversity of 
citizenship was absent. See id. at 377. Justice White disagreed with the majority, and 
would have granted the district court the power to entertain the case because the non-
federal claim arose out of a "common nucleus of operative fact" with a federal claim. Id. 
at 378-79 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 
(1966». White maintained that the plaintiff was only asserting a claim against someone 
who was already a party to the suit, and therefore ancillary jurisdiction should be 
recognized as providing power for the district court's review. Jd. at 382. 
34. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
35. Jd at 427-28, 439 (holding that the act of state doctrine precludes federal courts 
from examining foreign sovereigns' actions to determine whether a violation of 
international law has occurred). 
36. [d. at 439-41,450-51 (White, J., dissenting). 
37. Id at 461 (recognizing the foreign affairs authority of the executive). 
38. Jd at 462, 468. 
39. See id at 467-68, 470. 
40. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
41. [d. at 745, 752-53. 
42. [d. at 762 (White, J., dissenting). 
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cases must stop at the district line.43 As with Jenkins, the issue for Justice 
White was whether a State could absolve itself of compliance with a 
constitutional mandate through a maneuver executed through state 
law-devolving authority for public education to local governments, with 
district lines drawn by state law.44 
Consider finally Justice White's dissent in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,45 in 
which the Court held that the President is immune from damages liability 
for his official acts.46 The majority opinion is grounded in policy 
concerns
47 to which Byron White, a friend of Presidents, was intuitively 
sympathetic.48 But to him, Fitzgerald was a deviation from Marbury v. 
Madison49 just as Sabbatino was-a retreat from the power and duty of 
federal courts to announce, apply, and enforce the law.50 Particularly 
alarming, Justice White found, was the Court's suggestion that the 
Constitution itself might require absolute immunity.51 That was exactly 
43. Jd. at 762-63 (White, J., dissenting). 
44. See id. at 763 ("The result is that the State of Michigan, the entity at which the 
Fourteenth Amendment is directed, has successfully insulated itself from its duty to 
provide effective desegregation remedies by vesting sufficient power over its public 
schools in its local school districts."). 
45. 457 U.S. 731 (1982). 
46. Jd at 749 (concluding that the President (or former President in this case) is 
covered by absolute immunity from liability for damages resulting from his official 
actions). 
47. Jd. at 751-53 (arguing that private lawsuits would divert the President's energies 
from his duties and therefore pose risks to the effective functioning of the government, as 
well as the existence of a strong public interest in the President's ability to take official 
action without fearing vulnerability to civil damages). 
48. Justice White was close friends with John F. Kennedy. ABRAHAM, supra note 7, 
at 279. The two men met in London, while White was attending Oxford, both served as 
PT boat officers in the Navy, and President Kennedy appointed White as deputy attorney 
general, and later as Justice to the Supreme Court. Jd 
49. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Justice White points out in Fitzgerald that the 
Court ignored Marburys instruction that whether the legality of a head of a department's 
action would be reviewable by a court would "depend on the nature of [the] act." 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 766 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 165). White 
expressed concern with the Court's refusal to determine the immunity issue based on a 
distinction among categories of Presidential action, as called for in Marbury. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. at 766. 
50. See Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 797 (expressing dismay that the Court "casually" 
tosses away its role of judicial review, and thereby the role of lower courts, in ensuring 
protection of the law to all individuals). 
51. ./d at 765 ("The Court intimates that its decision is grounded in the Constitution. 
If that is the case, Congress cannot provide a remedy against Presidential misconduct and 
the criminal laws of the United States are wholly inapplicable to the President. I find this 
approach completely unacceptable."). See generally id at 770-83 (rejecting the majority's 
twin justifications for absolute immunity: an "incidental power" of the President, and the 
separation of powers doctrine). 
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the kind of broad, crippling, assertedly constitutional rule to which 
Justice White was most allergic.52 
Profoundly concerned with reinforcing the power of the national 
government, Justice White was most careful to include the judicial 
branch, as well as its political counterparts, within his protective 
embrace. For those of us who honor him today in this building, that care 
finds a signal place in the pantheon of his legacy. 
52. See e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,221-22 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the Court crafted a constitutional rule without any textual or historical support, White 
lamented: "[a]s an exercise of raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has authority to do 
what it does today; but in my view its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise 
of the power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to this Court"); see also 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 531-32 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). White cautioned: 
/d 
Decisions like these cannot rest alone on syllogism, metaphysics or some ill-
defined notions of natural justice, although each will perhaps play its part. In 
proceeding to such constructions as it now announces, the Court should also duly 
consider all the factors and interests bearing upon the cases, at least insofar as 
the relevant materials are available; and if the necessary considerations are not 
treated in the record or obtainable from some other reliable source, the Court 
should not proceed to formulate fundamental policies based on speculation 
alone. 
